Descrizione

The HTTP/2 front-end of the Zephyr HTTP server aliased connection receive state as a scratch output. In subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_http2.c, handle_http2_static_fs_resource() passed &client->data_len as the file_size out-parameter of http_server_find_file(). client->data_len is the count of unprocessed bytes remaining in the fixed-size per-connection receive buffer client->buffer[CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_CLIENT_BUFFER_SIZE] (256 bytes by default), an invariant every frame handler and the socket receive path rely on. Serving any static file therefore replaced that bounded value with the file's on-disk size, and nothing resets it afterwards. The defect is reached by an unauthenticated HTTP/2 GET for any file under the web root, in applications that register a static-filesystem resource (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS) with CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM=y; CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_VERSION_2 is enabled by default and no TLS or credentials are required on this path. Once client->data_len exceeds the buffer size, the frame dispatch loop in subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_core.c keeps parsing past the end of the received data, and the peer controls the bytes at client->cursor, so it can choose which fabricated frame the state machine consumes next by appending bytes after its request. The inflated length defeats the only guards on the buffer. parse_http_frame_header() and the per-frame handlers read and skip up to a 24-bit frame length beyond the buffer (out-of-bounds read); the compaction memmove(client->buffer, client->cursor, client->data_len) at the end of request handling copies the file-size number of bytes into the 256-byte buffer, overflowing the rest of struct http_client_ctx — including the current_detail/current_stream pointers, the parser_settings function-pointer table and the inactivity_timer work handler — and the adjacent client contexts in static memory; and the subsequent zsock_recv(client->fd, client->buffer + client->data_len, sizeof(client->buffer) - client->data_len, 0) underflows its size argument, writing attacker-supplied data of attacker-chosen length out of bounds. The impact is remote memory corruption in the server's single address space: at minimum a crash or hang of the device, and plausibly control-data overwrite leading to code execution. The HTTP/1 and HTTP/3 static-filesystem handlers already used a local variable and are unaffected; the fix makes the HTTP/2 handler use a local size_t file_size as well.

Testo originale del record CVE (in inglese).

Come correggere

Priorità: Alta — pianificare la correzione entro pochi giorni. Motivazione: CVSS 9.1, EPSS 0.8% (percentile 57).

Versioni da aggiornare

  • zephyrproject zephyr: vulnerabili le versioni dalla 4.0.0 precedenti alla 4.3.2 → aggiornare alla 4.3.2 o successiva.
  • zephyrproject zephyr: vulnerabili le versioni dalla 4.4.0 precedenti alla 4.5.0 → aggiornare alla 4.5.0 o successiva.

Mitigazioni temporanee

Da applicare solo se non è possibile aggiornare subito:

  • Ridurre la superficie esposta (disattivare servizi e funzionalità inutilizzati), mantenere attive le protezioni del sistema operativo (ASLR, DEP/NX) e segmentare la rete.

Verifica

  1. Individuare tutti gli asset con il prodotto interessato (inventario, scanner di vulnerabilità, CMDB).
  2. Confrontare la versione installata con quelle indicate sopra.
  3. Applicare l'aggiornamento in un ambiente di test, poi in produzione; riavviare i servizi se richiesto.
  4. Ripetere la scansione per confermare la correzione.

Configurazioni interessate

VendorProdottoVersioni vulnerabiliCorretta in
zephyrproject zephyr ≥ 4.0.0 < 4.3.2 4.3.2
zephyrproject zephyr ≥ 4.4.0 < 4.5.0 4.5.0

Riferimenti