Descrizione
In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the authentication decorators for feed-key requests (auth_feedkey_func in website/decorators.py) and API-key requests (auth_func in website/web/api/v1/common.py) called Flask-Login's login_user() function. This caused the HTTP response to a request authenticated solely by a feed key (supplied as the X-FEED-KEY URL parameter) or an API key (supplied as the X-API-KEY header) to set a session cookie that grants full authenticated access to every page in the application, without requiring a password or two-factor authentication. The practical impact is that any party possessing a leaked feed URL (a common occurrence, as feed URLs are shared with RSS readers) or an API key could obtain a valid web session for the associated account. This session provides access to the user's account page, which exposes the API key and other profile data, and for accounts with the administrator role, access to the /admin interface, enabling full administrative control of the application. The vulnerability affects all users whose feed key or API key is exposed. No prior authentication, user interaction, or special network conditions are required; a single HTTP request with the token is sufficient to establish the session. The session persists until it expires, and because it is not bound to the original credential (a related CWE-613 issue noted by the developers), revoking the feed key or API key does not invalidate the already-created session. The fix replaces the login_user() call with assignment to g._login_user, which Flask-Login's current_user property reads for the current request only, without writing any session cookie. The affected views remain unchanged and continue to see the authenticated user for the single request.
Come correggere
Priorità: Media — correggere nel prossimo ciclo di patch. Motivazione: CVSS 7.8, EPSS 0.3% (percentile 25).
Versioni da aggiornare
Il record non riporta ancora i prodotti e le versioni corrette (analisi NVD in corso). Consultare l'advisory del vendor nei riferimenti.
Indicazioni del vendor
Soluzione (testo originale del vendor):
The authentication decorators for feed-key and API-key requests no longer call Flask-Login's login_user(), which was writing the authenticated user into the session cookie and creating a full web session. Instead, the user object is now stored on Flask's request-scoped g._login_user attribute, which Flask-Login's current_user property reads first. This authenticates only the current request without setting any session cookie, preventing a limited-scope token from being elevated to a persistent, all-pages session that bypasses password and two-factor authentication.
Mitigazioni temporanee
Da applicare solo se non è possibile aggiornare subito:
- Non esporre l'interfaccia di gestione su Internet: consentire l'accesso solo da reti fidate e verificare la presenza di account, sessioni o chiavi non autorizzate.
Verifica
- Individuare tutti gli asset con il prodotto interessato (inventario, scanner di vulnerabilità, CMDB).
- Confrontare la versione installata con quelle indicate sopra.
- Applicare l'aggiornamento in un ambiente di test, poi in produzione; riavviare i servizi se richiesto.
- Ripetere la scansione per confermare la correzione.